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Abstract
This research advances the critical literature of humanitarian governance by demonstrating how ‘risk management’ is
reproduced within the governance and regulatory structures of humanitarian institutions and, crucially, how it distorts
patterns of emergency assistance coverage. Focusing on the impact of post-disciplinary forms of control, it reveals how
humanitarian resources are disciplined by banks’ responses to regulatory changes initiated by the adoption of counter-
terrorist financing legislation designed to counter flows ofmoney to terrorists. This has resulted in the systematic shedding
of NGO customers and the routine blocking of their international transactions—known as derisking. In an effort to limit
this, NGOs have adopted a ‘precautionary approach’ to managing risk in their own activities, limiting their ability to reach
some of themost vulnerable populations and curtailing innovation. Furthermore, the impact of this on the governance and
structure of the humanitarian system has spread beyond contexts of conflict into situations more conventionally labelled
as natural disasters such as drought, enabling the exercise of new techniques of power over significant parts of the human-
itarian system.
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1. Introduction
Calculations of risk permeate much of what humanitar-
ian agencies routinely do (Mackintosh & Duplat, 2013;
Schneiker, 2018) but academic study has neglected its
impact on humanitarian institutions and governance.
Attention has instead concentrated on the typology of
the risks of violence to humanitarian workers (Fox, 1999;
Stoddard, Harmer, & Haver, 2006), risk considerations
in humanitarianism’s defensive procedures and archi-
tecture (Bruderlein & Gassmann, 2006; Duffield, 2010;
Lacy, 2008; Smirl, 2008; Van Brabant, 1998) and the
interaction of beneficiary risk and vulnerability (Daniels,
Kettl, & Kunreuther, 2006; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, &
Davis, 2007). Yet relatively little attention has been
paid to how ‘risk management’ permeates the gov-
ernance and rationalities of humanitarian institutions
and, crucially, how it intrudes on humanitarian program-
ming and the resulting patterns of emergency assis-
tance coverage.
Specifically, the impact of state responses to 9/11
on the global banking system and its relationship to the
humanitarian system necessitate precisely such thought.
There is already considerable work (Keatinge, 2014;
Mackintosh & Duplat, 2013) that details the ways in
which banks have responded to the post-9/11 regula-
tory efforts regarding counter-terrorist financing (CTF)
and how states have legislated in ways that co-opt finan-
cial institutions into quasi-regulatory roles with regard
to the humanitarian community. Profound uncertainty
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about how these new CTF laws should be interpreted,
soaring regulatory fines imposed on banks for breaching
the rules, combined with statements and directives from
national and international regulatory bodies such as the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identifying the not-for-
profit sector generally as particularly vulnerable to abuse
by terrorists, has established within the financial sector
a global pattern of risk aversion to this type of business.
This is labelled as ‘derisking,’ the most visible manifesta-
tion of this being the ‘shuttering’ (closing down of) NGO
accounts. This has impacted seriously the operations of
humanitarian organisations and also brings into question
the continuing viability of core humanitarian principles,
predicated on access based solely on need.
This article charts three of the main ideas that
emerge from the sociology of risk (the ‘precautionary
principle,’ the impossibility of managing risk and the role
‘risk’ plays in shaping global governance) before map-
ping these onto the empirical findings of research con-
ducted on humanitarian responses to the Syrian civil war.
The findings firstly establish the scale of derisking before
evaluating whether bank derisking has led to the adop-
tion of a precautionary approach amongst NGOs and cre-
ated subjects able to be governed through the manipula-
tion of risk. They also establish the extent to which ‘risk’
has been ‘manageable’ in terms of humanitarian and CTF
outcomes. This illuminates the ways in which risk man-
agement thinking has reshaped humanitarian priorities
and governance.
2. The Sociology of Risk’s Big Ideas
The sociology of ‘risk’ has increasingly become con-
cernedwith the consequences for state–society relations
of managing risk; illustrated by Michael Power’s asser-
tion that not only are we living in a “Risk Society” where
we are now concerned with the “risk management of
everything” (Power, 2004). This literature emphasises
how considerations of risk have reshaped social insti-
tutions with a major strand drawing upon Beck’s asser-
tion of a ‘second modernity’ in which we are “increas-
ingly occupied with debating, preventing and manag-
ing risks that it itself has produced” (Giddens, 1999).
Describing this as “reflexive modernisation,” Beck identi-
fies a novel process in which society constantly reflects
on a growing tide of feedback information, resulting
in compulsive self-monitoring that itself generates both
novel surveillance technologies and also manufactures
new perceptions of risks. This has reoriented security cal-
culations away from a traditional vocabulary of “deter-
ring foes or defending against identifiable and acute
threats” towards an emphasis on “prevention, probabili-
ties, possible future scenarios andmanaging diffuse risk”
(Corry, 2012). Similarly, protracted projects such as the
‘War on Terror’ have resulted in the far-reaching expan-
sion of the precautionary principle into security matters
through the adoption of modes of preventive war and
thewholesale diffusion of “risk-management techniques
like registration, screening and profiling” in other modes
of governance (Beck, 1999).
While the findings across this broad literature are
diverse, three ideas have emerged as especially promi-
nent: that there exists a widespread and wary approach
towards an uncertain future (often described as the ‘pre-
cautionary principle’); that this fosters significant change
in both organisational behaviour and state society rela-
tions; and, finally, the existence of a profound uncertain-
ty as to whether risk can be managed through rational
regulatory means. Let’s take each of these in turn.
The precautionary principle idea results from the
challenges of managing what Beck characterises as ulti-
mately incalculable but high-consequence threats to
life and security and the corresponding framing of
governmental responses by what have been various-
ly described as logics of “pre-emption” (e.g., Cooper,
2006; Derrida, 2003) or the ‘precautionary principle.’
Risk management rationalities are also frequently por-
trayed as promoting a danger-averse strategy of con-
tainment, long-term management and the building of
governance-capacity through a “precautionary risk dis-
positive” (Diprose, Stephenson, Mills, Race, & Hawkins,
2008). Consequently, several writers point to the role
of risk in broadening processes of securitisation. Coker
(2002), echoed by Rasmussen (2006), for example, both
describe the precautionary principle and anticipatory
defence not simply as mutual analogies but as a sin-
gle strategic doctrine. Similarly, de Goede draws atten-
tion to the role ‘pre-emptive security’ in strategic cal-
culations resulting in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 but
also highlights how it became apparent much more
widely, especially in efforts to curtail terrorist financing
(de Goede, 2008).
While these ideas have clearly penetrated the fields
of security studies, they transform several convention-
al notions. ‘Threat,’ for example, the possibility of
direct and immediate harm, is intentionally swollen to
encompass the conditions for the possibility for harm.
Equally, notions of territorial defence and deterrence
also become far broader concerns for the management
of increasingly unbounded risks and uncertainty, with
profound implications particularly for previously tightly
focused collective security organisations such as NATO
(Rasmussen, 2001).
Furthermore, risk is imagined as a chronic and per-
manent condition. This approach is a key feature of a
re-imagined modernity that functions through appear-
ing to make a seemingly unpredictable and unruly future
calculable. Whereas, theoretically, threats can be coun-
tered effectively, risks cannot. They are an imagined and
permanent fixture of an uncertain future, leading some
to conclude that in a “risk society there is no such thing as
perfect security” (Rasmussen, 2006) as even when risks
fail to materialise their potential remains. Similarly, if a
risk materialises as a ‘real’ and harmful event it does
not dissipate once finished as the memory will contin-
ue to shape the imaginary of the future and, if anything,
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only validate the possibility of future risks. In this way
risk always haunts the future in ways that threats do not,
leading to the resolute orientation of organisational risk
calculations towards curbing future possibilities.
Risk is also inextricably bound up with notions of
power and governance by constructing processes, peo-
ple, or things politically in terms of their potential risks.
Giddens explains that the idea of risk “is bound up with
the aspiration to control and particularly the idea of
controlling the future” (Giddens, 1999). Undoubtedly,
both its definitional and conceptual ambiguity (Bhimani,
2009) and the process of defining it create opportuni-
ties for elites to establish and exercise power. Drawing
on roots in the organisational studies literature, where
theorising power has long been a core preoccupation
(Alvesson & Deetz, 2006; Clegg, 2006; Knights & Roberts,
1982; Lukes, 2005; Munro, 2000), risk literature con-
sistently identifies sources of power as located in the
ways in which risk management is instrumentalised to
create or sustain power structures by institutions, pro-
fessions, or individuals (Miller & Rose, 2010). Equally
from a Foucauldian perspective, managing risk is a con-
stitutive practice of neo-liberal governmentality that is
able to legitimise and structure the control of insti-
tutions and individuals at arm’s length. It provides a
“way of organizing reality, disciplining the future, tam-
ing chance and rationalizing individual conduct” (Aradau
& van Munster, 2007). Other writers, especially those
inspired by Bourdieu and Foucault, dispense with ratio-
nalist risk instrumentalization as a modernist tool for
sharing ‘risk’ and calculating insurance premiums, recon-
figuring it instead as a mode of governmentality, a tech-
nology through which institutions manufacture and har-
ness unease in order to legitimise their role in the pro-
vision of security and protection (Bigo, 2002). For these
writers, governing through the articulation and naming
of risks results in a mushrooming of populations under
the control of governments and subject to disparate
forms of surveillance,monitoring and profiling (Aradau&
vanMunster, 2007). Implicit within this pessimistic vision
is the piecemeal, cumulative and excessive growth of
governmental power built on a combination of legitimat-
ing logics that blend biopolitical modes of control, calcu-
lations of risk and security thinking.
Furthermore, risk management is ubiquitous with
all social domains imagined as requiring management
through analogous techniques and instruments. Ericson,
Doyle, and Barry (2003) extend this logic , arguing that
risk thinking promotes an economically rational decision-
making model that leads to neo-liberal notions of ratio-
nality colonising increasingly diverse social, economic
and political domains and bending the dominant logic of
each to an ‘economic’ rationality. This argument paints
risk management as an expansionary and normatively
prescriptive rationality.
The complicity of risk management in creating sub-
jects that are capable of being governed is where we
can see the greatest crossover with some humanitarian
scholarship. Foucauldian ideas have been powerfully res-
onant within theworks of writers including Fassin (2012),
Pandolfi (2002), McFalls (2010) and, most prominently,
Duffield (2014), who each emphasise how humanitarian
technologies and institutions are used by northern states
to render populations in the global south as governable.
Risk management as a mode of extending the north’s
capacity to govern is consistent with this. By construct-
ing both the distant and formerly ungovernable ‘victim’
populations, especially those under the control of pro-
scribed non-state armed groups, and the humanitarian
organisations that seek to sustain them as manufactur-
ers of societal risk, it is possible for the global north to
render both as real and governable. Constructed in this
way, they can be wilfully steered through political and
bureaucratic action, making real Foucault’s idea of gov-
erning populations and economies rather than territo-
ries or moral communities (Foucault, 2003).
The third powerful idea is that of risk’s ultimate
ungovernability. This can be traced to Ulrich Beck’s iden-
tification of risks as being constructed through the inter-
action of reflexivity and technological change resulting
in the cascading identification of multiplying risks in an
ever-growing set of social domains. Beck conceives of the
rationalist idea of the manageability of risk as a veneer
covering the reality of chronic and pervasively uncon-
trollable risk, ultimately warning us that, in a ‘world
risk society,’ “the very idea of controllability, certain-
ty or security—which is so central to first modernity—
collapses” (Beck, 1992). In this sense rationalism’s claim
to be able to control uncertainty dissolves because of,
rather than despite, the pursuit of security.
This idea has been popularised by a growing identi-
fication of the global financial crisis’s roots in the lim-
its of regulatory ability to manage systemic risk (Millo
& MacKenzie, 2009). It taps into wider academic and
popular debates that challenge the dominant models of
economic risk management developed since the 1980s
and engage critically with managerial ideologies (Power,
2009). Hence critiques of risk management blend into
broader ideas of the failure of the techniques of manage-
rial rationalities, statistico-probabilistic techniques and
science generally—suggesting that these might be inef-
fective or ultimately may in fact reduce societal security
(Bijker, 2006).
The mechanisms for this failure have been explored
by a number of authors (Huber & Scheytt, 2013; Power,
Scheytt, Soin, & Sahlin, 2009) and have focused on the
implications of increasing reliance on systems that cor-
respond to images of manageability, and therefore of
transparency, accountability and auditability. But efforts
to uphold the myths and discourses of manageabili-
ty divert attention from the pursuit of functionality.
In other words, it becomes more important for organ-
isational legitimacy that activities are rendered visibly
auditable and capable of being subjected to manageri-
al intervention—and if they cannot be made to conform,
they risk becoming literally unthinkable.
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Rothstein, Huber, and Gaskell (2006) echo this
approach, arguing that risk management is firmly root-
ed in the pervasive logic of reputation and precaution-
ary risk. Facing heightened oversight and accountability,
regulatory bodies are pressured to account for “their con-
strained ability tomanage their regulatory objects.”With
potential ‘failure’ being inherent in the logic of risk, con-
structing the subjects of regulation in terms of risk pro-
vides a defensible and legitimate procedural rationality
for regulators to manage both their regulatory objects
and their own growing reputational risks of regulatory
failure. This reflexive aspect of risk governance is used
to explain the ways in which risk considerations expand
theobjects andmethods of regulation but also the poten-
tial for divergences between regulator’s declaratory and
underlying purposes. An excessive focus on managing
the regulatory bodies’ own reputational risk may, they
argue, result in dealing less effectively with the manage-
ment of societal risks or those risks for which the regula-
tor was in fact established.
3. Methodology
These ideas provide a valuable lens through which to
analyse the international response to the Syrian cri-
sis and were examined through research conducted in
Turkey, Lebanon, the UK and Northern Syria (facilitated
by a major European based NGO that did not want to be
named as sponsoring this research). Information was col-
lated from interviews conducted in Arabic or English in
each of these countries (n= 73) as well as round tables
(n = 11) and a survey (N = 297). The typology of NGO
types used was developed from a taxonomy identified
by INTRAC (the International NGO Training and Research
Centre) and ACAPs (Assessment Capacities Project), two
major NGO consortia:
• Category 1: Small, new Syrian NGOs often commu-
nity based.
• Category 2: Larger, more established Syrian NGOs.
• Category 3: Syrian international non-govern-
mental organisations (INGOs). Larger, more estab-
lished Syrian NGOs that had expanded their oper-
ational reach to more than one additional state
suffering from a humanitarian emergency.
• Category 4: Islamic INGOs with offices also in
Turkey and/or Lebanon.
• Category 5: US or European INGOs with pro-
grammes in Syria and operating from Lebanon or
Turkey regional hubs.
Those NGOs consulted were largely emergency-based
commodity and medical services providers. Another
strand of the research programme involved interviewing
European banks to determine whether the impact of reg-
ulatory changes, the risks of fines and the unprofitability
of the NGO sector was a factor or the factor in decisions
to de-bank NGO customers. The findings are beyond the
scope of this article but the evidence strongly suggests
they were in fact themajor factor in decision-making.
4. Findings and Discussion
4.1. Overview of Findings
The research identified a sustained process of bank
derisking resulting in a widespread reduction in the
number of banks willing or able to receive payments
for NGOs. During interviews, major European banks
themselves recognised the powerful and overwhelm-
ing effect that regulatory changes and the possibility of
fines/reputational damage had on the balance between
risks and profitability and the impact this had on their
willingness to debank NGOs. NGOs consistently argued
that this posed a severe and, in some cases, existential
risk (see Table 1). Syrian NGOs of all sizes, but particu-
larly the smallest, were most affected by Turkish bank
shuttering. All were affected to varying degrees on at
Table 1. Trajectory of your ability to handle derisking.
Category
1. Small, new 2. Larger, 3. Syrian 4. Islamic 5. US or European
Syrian NGOs more INGOs INGOs with INGOs with
established offices in programmes in
Syrian NGOs Turkey and/or Syria and operating




Serial N = 97 N = 54 N = 14 N = 29 N = 103
On balance are you more 1. More 0% 22% 57% 21% 5%
or less able to handle the
impact of correspondent 2. Same 3% 7% 29% 76% 93%
banking problems than
two years ago? 3. Less 97% 61% 14% 3% 2%
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least one occasion and in ways that were not obviously
dependent on the institutional ‘quality’ of the affected
organisation. European and North American NGOs also
faced considerable challenges with their own domestic
banks, but on a lesser scale (but crucially extending to
all humanitarian crises where proscribed organisations
existed). Consequently, NGO staff deemed the probabil-
ity of bank derisking as incalculable yet growing, and
increasingly difficult to predict but with the potential for
severe consequences.
The survey revealed that NGOsworking on the Syrian
crisis have increasingly encountereddifficulties receiving,
moving and storingmoney via the formal banking system
and that they perceived the situation to be worsening
(Table 1). Banks have demanded increasing amounts of
information—leading to delays, blockages and occasion-
ally returns of donations, freezing or blocking of accounts
and the declination of requests to open new accounts.
There was considerable evidence that both client banks
and correspondent banks continued to block NGO finan-
cial transactions and that SyrianNGOs of all sizes, but par-
ticularly the smallest were most affected by correspon-
dent bank delays and bank shuttering in Turkey.
Syrian NGOs of all sizes, but particularly the smallest,
were most affected by Turkish bank shuttering, with all
of them affected to varying degrees on at least one occa-
sion (Table 2). However, European and North American
NGOs also faced considerable challenges with domestic
debanking but on a reduced scale.
The probabilities of correspondent banking delays
were highest amongst type 1 and 2 NGO categories, usu-
ally the smaller Syrian NGOs with the greatest access
to Syrian communities in the more difficult areas—and
heavily relied upon by the INGO community to reach
Syrian communities (see Table 3).
Delays and challenges with correspondent banking
were felt to be increasing faster than the NGO sector’s
capacity to manage bank behaviour (Table 4, serials 1.1
to 1.4 and 2.5)
While the surveys revealed the increasing scale of
derisking behaviour the interviews revealed the unpre-
dictable and inconsistent ways in which bank derisking
occurred. Even NGOs with well-developed and sophis-
ticated compliance processes argued that they faced a
high degree of riskwhen it came to international financial
transactions supporting their Syrian operations. As one
NGO Finance director, after having taken me on a labo-
rious tour of the NGO’s compliance department, record
keeping and forensic accounting processes, explained:
We do not understand why transactions are stopped.
One week a payment will get through and the next
month another identical payment will be stopped.
There is the same money—amount, currency, donor
Table 2. Bank shuttering (twice or more).
Category
Serial 1 2 3 4 5
1. Overall 100% 100% 100% 100% 41%
2. In Turkey 100% 100% 100% 83% 52%
3. In state of HQ (unless Turkey) N/A N/A N/A 14% 18%
Table 3. Correspondent bank problems to Turkish/Lebanese accounts.
Category
Serial 1 2 3 4 5
1. Routine (the majority of transactions) 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2. Frequent (quarter to a half of all transactions) 0% 72% 50% 31% 22%
3. Significant (under a quarter of all transactions) 0% 28% 50% 69% 63%
4. Rare (less than 5% of transactions) 0% 0% 0% 0% 15%
5. Overall 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 4. Perception of changes in correspondent banking delays.
Category
Serial 1 2 3 4 5
1. Increasing 100% 100% 100% 100% 0%
2. Staying the same—bad 0% 0% 0% 0% 63%
3. Staying the same inconvenient 0% 0% 0% 0% 22%
4. Reducing or you are more able to manage the issues? 0% 0% 0% 0% 15%
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and programme. The bank will not tell us what
is different.
We found examples from all of the interviewees in cate-
gory 3 (Syrian NGOs with offices in Turkey plus one oth-
er state) who made repeated (five or more) and almost
identical financial transactions (same donor, same
respondent banks, same humanitarian programmes, dol-
lar denominations of approximately $150,000 each) that
were treated differently (some rejected, some delayed
and some passed immediately)—suggesting a consider-
able element of randomness in the process. In each
case the affected NGO was not informed of the name
of the correspondent bank used in the transaction or
the grounds upon which the transaction was terminat-
ed or delayed nor were they given the opportunity to
provide additional documentation or explain their case—
effectively stymieing any redress or enabling adapta-
tions to facilitate future transactions. The unpredictable
nature of bank derisking rendered the probabilistic risk
to NGOs as incalculable.
Despite considerable efforts to make money trans-
fers auditable, due to the absence of any functioning
banks in rebel-held areas of Syria, all NGOs systematical-
ly reported that they used the hawala system (Table 5) to
transmit larger sums of money for staff wages and items
purchased in Syria.
Hawala is a traditional trust-based system of trans-
ferring money used in Arab countries and South Asia,
in which money is paid to an agent who then instructs
an associate in the relevant country or area to pay the
final recipient. Hawala is frequently viewed as an infor-
malmethod of transferringmoneywithout physicalmon-
ey actually moving and exists largely outside of tradition-
al banking systems. It is illegal in several jurisdictions.
In Syria, several major hawala networks have been co-
opted by armed actors but elsewhere they serve a vital
function in granting access to the unbanked and under-
banked populations of the world.
Hence, regardless of the increasing auditability of
the formal NGOmanagement processes, allmoney used
in Syria passed through unregulated and largely unau-
ditable channels.
Empirically, therefore, this demonstrates both the
scale and perceived incalculability of the bank derisk-
ing risk.
4.2. Evidence of a Precautionary Approach
But what impact does this enhanced ‘risk’ of bank derisk-
ing has on humanitarian NGOs and, specifically, does
decision-making increasingly revolve around the precau-
tionary principle: a danger averse strategy in the face
of incalculable but imminent and potentially catastroph-
ic threats?
Many NGOs struggled to disentangle the effects of
factors that already restricted programming choices and
agency presence in conflict settings: high levels of inse-
curity, incomplete/inaccurate/missing baseline or cur-
rent needs assessment information, agency programme
preferences, differential links to particular communities,
donor preferences, manipulation by armed actors, acces-
sibility of community interlocutors, etc. Interviewees
also described institutional incentives that encouraged
the clustering of humanitarian agencies in the more
accessible and often government-controlled areas, irre-
spective of underlying patterns of need. Historically,
humanitarian programming at a macro or country level
tends to follow the coincidence of population concen-
trations and logistical access, whereas, understandably,
the least densely populated and most challenging to
reach areas tend to attract fewer programmes. This fre-
quently results in some populations receiving higher per
capita levels of assistance than more dispersed groups,
even with the same levels of underlying need. Similarly,
donors and NGOs often prefer to fund programmes with
fewer risks and the potential to reach more recipients,
leading to an innate bias towards themore populous and
accessible areas. However, interviewees suggested that
derisking added an additional factor that amplified this
pre-existing bias. They painted a vivid picture of human-
itarian organisations in Turkey increasingly anticipating
the possibility of bank derisking in their programming
decisions and reacting to this with more conservative
activities, especially reducing cash elements in program-
ming and activities in areas controlled by proscribed
organisations. Syrian NGOs, those with the greatest over-
all levels of access, were consistently able to identify
areas, almost invariably overlapping with areas under
the control of (or accessed through areas controlled by)
proscribed organisations, that were impossible to reach
in ways that conformed to their banks’ risk appetites
(see Table 6).
Furthermore, (compared with the period until 2014)
there was evidence of substantial modification or cur-
tailment of humanitarian activities in these areas (see
Table 7).
Although this trend was less pronounced amongst
INGOs, many of these worked through local NGOs (who
were impacted and sometimes obscured the ways in
which they continued to work in these areas). An NGO’s
financial controller told me that “we know our bank will
Table 5. Regular use of hawala or cash transfers into Syria.
Category
1 2 3 4 5
Use of hawala or cash transfers into Syria 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% (only 43 answers)
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Table 6. Is it possible to identify geographical areas where you believe it is impossible to deliver assistance lawfully?
Category
Serial Relative difficulty 1 2 3 4 5
1 Yes, easily 100% 100% 100% 7% 20%
2 Yes, with difficulty 100% 100% 100% 79% 17%
3 No 0% 0% 0% 14% 61%
Table 7. Perception of organisation self-limiting in hard-to-reach and besieged areas.
Category
Perception 1 2 3 4 5
Perception of organisation self-limiting in hard-to-reach and besieged areas 20% 15% 57% 20% 11%
(% answering ‘yes’)
not let us move money for these areas so we do not.”
A senior staff member from one Syrian INGO reported
that “our organisation has never worked in those areas.
There is too much risk. As we became bigger, we talked
[about it]. We know it would be a problem with banks
and donors. We still do not work in these places.” I iden-
tified 11 organisations of all sizes (from categories 1
and 2) that privately admitted to making these sorts of
strategic choices and a further 6 who variously obfus-
cated records or substituted in-kind deliveries for cash
elements. Of the five category 2 NGOs interviewed, all
claimed to work mainly or significantly outside of these
areas but admitted to obfuscating reporting for donors
by stressing work outside of the difficult areas but divert-
ing some of the resources to help in the most desperate
of besieged communities. “This is a big risk for us.We are
not allowed. But what do [should] we do? There is no
choice.” In effect their own version of the humanitarian
imperative compelled them in themost severe situations
into a twilight zone of illegality.
Managing reputational risk was also amajor factor in
decision-making. Significant numbers of INGO and Syrian
NGO interviewees confirmed their unwillingness to work
directly or transparently in areas under the control of pro-
scribed organisations specifically because of concerns
that this would damage their reputation through list-
ing on commercial risk management databases used
by banks to calculate risk exposure, such as Thomson
Reuters World Check (TRWC) or its equivalent. There
was significant concern amongst NGOs that such block-
ages arose from appearing on consolidated watchlists of
the type maintained by TRWC (there are others includ-
ing RiskScreen KYC Global but only TRWC was specifical-
ly mentioned in interviews) and routinely used by bank
compliance departments. The TRWC databasemaintains
records containing details on 2,2 million persons who
have in common that they are considered Politically
Exposed Persons or ‘heightened risk individuals’ and
organisations to help to identify and manage financial,
regulatory and reputational risk. Despite its widespread
usage the database has not been without controversy.
The BBC Radio 4 programme HSBC, Moslems and Me
reported finding information in World-Check based on
Wikipedia entries, biased blogs and state-backed news
agencies. There have also been a number of cases of
benign organisations being wrongly listed.
One senior NGO staff member privately told us that
“we cannot work there [the areas under proscribed
organisation control]. We will be listed and not able to
work in Turkey or Syria.” Another indicated that they
feared even being mentioned on these lists—they “can
mean the death of a humanitarian organisation working
in Syria”, he claimed (referring to derisking).
The numbers affected by these choices were con-
siderable. According to UN estimates in mid-2016 the
Assad government forces besieged 200,000 people in
Eastern Ghouta, Daraya, Zabadani and Madaya; ISIS
200,000 people in Deir ez-Zour; and diverse ranges
of militia, including the former al-Nusra Front, had a
further 12,500 in Fu’a, Kefraya and Idlib. Interviewees
reported that the southern suburb enclave outside of
Damascus was especially problematic. These had been
surrounded by Syrian military forces and sectarian pro-
government militias and the besieged neighbourhoods
(including Yelda, Babbila, Beit Sahm, al-Qadam Yarmouk
and Hajar al-Aswad) were also controlled by a patch-
work of armed groups including ISIS, the former al-
Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (now Hay’at Tahrir al-
Sham), as well as various other armed opposition groups.
Areas under the control of Hezbollah were reported
as difficult but not impossible to reach from Lebanon,
but again respondents argued that the imposition of
anti-money laundering and CTFs legislation’s ‘strict lia-
bility’ approach had created a further ‘chilling effect’—
causing their organisations to resist supporting these
communities in all but the most compelling of circum-
stances. The ‘risk’ of goods or funding being diverted
to proscribed organisations, causing reputational dam-
age to the NGO and triggering catastrophic bouts of
bank derisking clearly reinforced conservatism in human-
itarian programming. The precautionary approach arose
from the incalculability and imminence of derisking plus
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 306–318 312
its potentially catastrophic impact on access to finan-
cial institutions.
4.3. Creating Subjects Capable of Being Governed
through Risk
9/11 created new opportunities for states to define
threats and their attendant risks. The FATF, the cen-
tral institution of the global financial regulatory regime,
clearly identified theNGO community as ‘particularly vul-
nerable’ to manipulation by terrorist entities. One of its
influential recommendations (Recommendation 8) iden-
tified NGOs collectively as possessing “characteristics
thatmake them particularly attractive to terrorists or vul-
nerable to misuse for terrorist financing” (FATF, 2008).
This conclusion was driven by concerns that NGOs would
divert funds, affiliate with proscribed organisations, con-
tribute to recruitment, be manipulated by terrorists or
established as fund raising sham organisations. Hence,
humanitarian NGOswere clearly designated as providers
of risk and subject to risk management.
Some states exploited this. Turkey, host to the main
humanitarian effort into Syria, opportunistically utilised
risk management to manage the humanitarian system’s
priorities and align them with its own strategic inter-
ests. Turkey, overwhelmed by the scale of the humanitar-
ian crisis, initially embraced the international aid effort
despite a tradition of distrust for both civil society and
outsiders operating in the country. It provided the large-
ly autonomous humanitarian system with considerable
latitude, relaxing numerous bureaucratic requirements
and turning a blind eye to many NGO practices (Heller,
2017). This began to change as Syria’s emergency trans-
formed into what appeared to be an indefinite commit-
ment and Turkey’s own domestic security became far
more uncertain. Conflict reignited with Kurdish insur-
gents and jihadists became more active on both sides
of the Turkish–Syrian border. At the same time the
NGO community grew, with both new Syrian NGOs and
INGOs expanding their presence in, and operations from,
Turkish border towns.
From 2014, Turkish authorities placed pressure on
NGOs to formally register with the state. However, the
humanitarian community faced byzantine bureaucrat-
ic processes: confusing procedures, long administrative
delays and what were felt to be arbitrary and inconsis-
tent decisions. One NGO director stated that:
Some Syrian NGOs were rejected and were not told
why, others had to wait months for their permits and
couldn’t register for bank accounts in the meantime.
Others were given six-month, one year, 18-month,
two year or five-year permits. We could not under-
stand what was going on.
One senior UN official, interviewed on condition of
anonymity for both himself and his agency, suggested
that this:
Was seen by some as Turkey returning to its old ways
of doing bureaucratic business but there was a new
suspicion that this was also a restoration of its tradi-
tional distrust of foreigners and a political effort to
gain control of the aid flowing into Syria.
An INGO country director concluded that the ambiguity
and absence of transparency of the process as a whole
was also viewed as a way of maintaining pressure on
the NGO community to acquiesce. A Syrian NGODirector
based in Istanbul argued that “they don’t want us to
speak out about them. If we are not registered, they can
close us downwhenever theywant…andwe cannot com-
plain about them and what they do.”
The growth in the formal regulation of NGOs was
accompanied by increasing controls on the movement
of NGO staff across the Turkish–Syrian border. From the
middle of 2015, Turkey imposed increasing restrictions
on NGO cross-border activities, initially limiting the num-
ber of staff able to cross into or out of Syria to seven and
subsequently reducing this further to five and restrict-
ing the site of their crossing to the checkpoints at Bab
al-Hawa andKobane. Turkish officials interviewed for this
project indicated that these measures were intended to
prevent the flow of foreign fighters into Syria rather than
shape the humanitarian effort. But it adversely impact-
ed both the effectiveness of the aid effort and also
the auditability and transparency of humanitarian pro-
grammes in Syria.
The gradual imposition of such restrictions com-
pounded the already limited access due to high levels of
insecurity (especially in ISIS-controlled areas) and forced
even Syrian NGOs to rely increasingly on remote man-
agement. This itself had consequences both for account-
ability relationships and the transparency of aid flows.
One NGO director complained that “how am I able to
monitor my projects if I cannot see them? I have to
be transparent but I cannot even see. How can this
work?” Several NGO directors complained “you cannot
have [both] transparency and big restrictions on cross-
border staff movement” while one especially vexed NGO
director argued that this “makes it more difficult to
talk to banks and let them know we are able to man-
age where the money gets to in Syria.” This was felt to
restrict their ability to limit aid diversion, navigate the
politics of the numerous political groups and compet-
ing armed actors or being manipulated by claimants to
leadership positions—further encouraging a precaution-
ary approach to programming risk.
The Turkish authorities maintained a regime of NGO
regulation that manufactured incalculable bureaucrat-
ic risks, encouraging forms of self-regulatory (or pre-
cautionary) behaviour on the part of NGOs in order to
avoid antagonising the Turkish authorities. By effective-
ly entrenching NGO vulnerability it created an imminent
risk to NGOs that the Turkish authorities could close
down any NGO that transgressed the political appetites
of the Erdogan administration.
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Syrian NGOs based in Turkey also faced widespread
debanking by Turkish banks as well as problems access-
ing money already transferred from abroad, particular-
ly when the Syrian organisation used ‘Syria’ or ‘Sham’
(referencing ‘Damascus’ and its environs) in the title.
One Turkish-registered, Syrian-staffed NGO, reported
how they were debanked and were then unsuccessful
in gaining access to banking services for several months
until they changed their name and logo, ensured that
their trustees were known as secular rather than reli-
gious personalities and changed their organisational logo
to one that did not provide any form of indication
that this was an Islamic or Syrian NGO. At least sev-
en Turkish-registered, Syrian-staffed NGOs, with offices
in Istanbul reported that even after changes to organi-
sational names, logos, a secularisation of trustees and
senior officials as well as Turkish registration they were
unable to predictably access money already in their
Turkish accounts.
The exercise of power through risk management was
also manifest less obviously. Syrian NGOs with the least
problems in terms of bank derisking were a group of six
who enjoyed strong sub-contracting relationships with
major European NGOs themselves funded by European
states. This category emerged during the Syrian crisis and
increasingly adopted western and largely secular gover-
nance models and western modes of transparency and
managerial control. All had made very visible and signifi-
cant changes to their financial accountability and gover-
nance arrangements in response both to advice from the
donor NGO and in anticipation of future problems with
their banks. The donor INGO invariably held the smaller
organisation to the same transparency and governance
standards as they too were held by their state donors
and regulatory bodies, suggesting a cascade of common
professional standards of accountability and transparen-
cy. In effect, considerations of risk rendered the Syrian
NGOs as subjects of managerial and auditing logics and
reduced the ability of several to provide assistance in
areas where programme auditability was not possible—
critically the areas under the control of proscribed organ-
isations. Despite the legitimising role played by these
processes in upholding the myth of manageability, with-
in Syria all of this category of NGOs utilised precisely
the same informal and opaque money transfer systems
used by the smaller and less process-driven organisa-
tions and therefore shared many of the same underlying
risks of financial diversion andmanipulation (see Table 5).
In effect, the myths of transparency and accountabili-
ty, and the creation of subjects capable of being audit-
ed, failed to address the real underlying risks of financial
diversion once money passed into Syria.
Nevertheless, the combination of the Turkish author-
ities’ and European NGOs’ use of risk management clear-
ly rendered Syrian humanitarian organisations as both
real and governable: That is to say, as meaningful enti-
ties that could be wilfully steered and subjected to
non-disciplinary forms of self-regulation. Equally, con-
structing the larger Syrian NGOs as auditable and reflec-
tive of myths of manageability enhanced their legitimacy
in the eyes of donor states and banks, although it ulti-
mately failed to address the risks of aid diversion once
money and commodities had crossed the Turkish border
into Syria.
4.4. Effectiveness of Humanitarian and Regulatory
Outcomes
The declaratory aim of FATF’s global financial regulatory
framework established post-9/11was both tomake NGO
financial transactionsmore transparent and accountable
but also not to “disrupt or discourage legitimate chari-
table activities.” (Statewatch, 2015). Both were explicit
objectives. Yet this research indicates that the former
objective undermined the latter, resulting from the pre-
cautionary approach adopted to mitigate derisking limit-
ing access to the most vulnerable communities and hin-
dering timely and relevant forms of assistance.
A particular challenge was maintaining the relevance
of needs assessments conducted (in fluid situations)
whenmoney could be unpredictably delayed in the bank-
ing system by an average of four to six months. All of
the Syrian NGOs in categories 1 and 2 and a quarter of
INGOs in category 5 faced significant problems in main-
taining the timeliness or relevance of responses in sit-
uations of rapid onset need or change in these circum-
stances (Table 8).
Seasonal projects, particularly those in the context
of fluid population movements, appeared to be partic-
ularly vulnerable to delays in transfers, e.g., agricultur-
al projects or winterisation kits, as were programmes
for very vulnerable communities in besieged or hard-to-
reach areas. Five category 2 NGOs described at length
the impact of these delays on their ability to purchase
tools, seeds and agricultural inputs in Syria in time for
the planting seasons and during lulls in the fighting.Most
of these NGOs sought to adapt to the chronic reduction
in liquidity, using combinations of their own resources,
engaging in money and commodity swaps with other
NGOs and also, in extremis, simply not telling the entire
truth on how the assistance actually reaches the popu-
lations. However, in the absence of sufficient financial
liquidity, most ruthlessly prioritised projects, focusing on
the larger population groups in themore stable areas and
not responding in others. Whilst in some ways this priori-
tisation was inevitable, the reality was in fact one of a
creeping and ruthless triage.
NGOs also routinely privileged existing partnerships
and suppliers, resulting in assistance strategies ossify-
ing along the lines of greatest transparency in deliv-
ery chains. In effect, acceptable partnerships and ‘legit-
imate’ receipts—rather than the most pressing needs—
shaped programming decisions. Given the humanitarian
systems’ reliance on the smaller and most agile organisa-
tions’ ability to respond to rapid onset needs and fill gaps
left by the larger, more unwieldy actors, increasing rigidi-
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Table 8. Over two years has your concern for bank derisking impacted on your ability to respond to rapid changes in
humanitarian need?
Category
Serial Impact 1 2 3 4 5
1 Yes, significantly. Frequent and important limits on timeliness 100% 100% 21% 17% 26%
or relevance of response
2 No, coping measures ameliorate the majority of all impact 0% 0% 14% 24% 3%
3 No, coping measures ameliorate the majority of all impact 0% 0% 14% 24% 3%
ties in programming was problematic for the system as
a whole.
The systematic blockage of aid convoys by belliger-
ent groups also left programme managers with a devil’s
bargain: Cash was often easier to move into the most dif-
ficult areas through the twilight world of hawala bank-
ing but was almost impossible to justify to banks (even
if donors were largely aware of what was happening).
Some accepted the risk of debanking and maintained
programming while others switched from cash program-
ming to the provision of food baskets because of the
relative ease of accounting. However, because of the
impact of checkpoints blocking the passage of commodi-
ties, these programmes were often refocussed to areas
where needs were less pressing but there was a greater
possibility of reaching beneficiaries.
Some of the more established and ‘professionalised’
Syrian NGOs pursued a different strategy, identifying
the hawala operators and supplier companies and part-
ner groups in Syria. The finance director for one con-
firmed that they maintained lists of and receipts in the
hope that this would be sufficient to keep the bank hap-
py. But this approach worked predominantly with larg-
er well-established NGOs who made the geographical-
ly most conservative programming choices, and invari-
ably had strong sub-contracting relationships with (par-
ticularly) major European NGOs. But even in these cases
there were numerous examples of delays and blockages
in bank transactions.
The requirement for visibility in the logistics and
hawala chains made impossible the rapid adaptation to
the humanitarian consequences of tactical changes on
the battlefield. For example, the sudden movement of
populations brought on by unexpected political accom-
modations such as the four-cities deal in 2017, the mili-
tary fall of formerly besieged areas (such as Deir Az Zor in
2017) or the use of chemical weapons precipitating pop-
ulation displacement. These were cited as events that
led to turbulence in the hawala and supplier markets
and overstretched the Turkish-based NGO community.
One programme manager explained:
When there is a big change brought about by the war,
a community is displaced, we find new money net-
works or our [suppliers] partners change. We some-
times do not know who we are working with. But the
population is desperate. What do we do?
These circumstances required challenging choices
between adhering to due diligence procedures (back-
ground and identity checks on suppliers and beneficia-
ries) and responding to sudden onset need.
NGOs, fearing derisking, reduced the cash elements
(see Table 9) in programmes, especially in besieged or
hard-to-reach areas, resulting in their inability to pay
wages for teachers, buy fuel or support microfinance
programming. One of the more established and larger
Syrian NGOs explained how one of their larger educa-
tion programmes had been forced to cut the teacher
salary component in half and they were considering fur-
ther cuts. Others, discouraged by the threat of derisk-
ing and routine delays/obstructions, shifted away from
supporting teachers’ salaries to in-kind support such as
whiteboards, markers and textbooks. Seven NGO inter-
viewees told us how they had ceased ‘orphan sponsor-
ship’ in three separate hard-to-reach areas, because of
Table 9. In practice how do you consider cash elements when designing specific programmes in hard-to-reach or
besieged areas?
Category
Serial Consideration 1 2 3 4 5
1 Something to be minimised where possible due to bank 59% 63% 57% 0% 12%
derisking concerns
2 A useful tool considered on the same basis as everything else 32% 28% 29% 76% 79%
bank derisking concerns are secondary to practicalities
3 The preferred and first choice in most cases. An opportunity 9% 9% 14% 24% 9%
in which the risks can be largely ameliorated
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problems making regular payments to orphans and vul-
nerable female-headed families. In one of the hard-to-
reach areas, the majority of the beneficiaries had moved
out of Syria largely due to the inability of NGOs to pre-
vent further and catastrophic impoverishment.
Twenty-three interviewees argued that this trend dis-
couraged innovation and more appropriate forms of pro-
gramming while re-incentivising a return to commodity-
based interventions when more differentiated, sophis-
ticated and targeted humanitarian instruments were
required. OneNGOdirector lamented that “it is not sensi-
ble to provide only food. Communities needmore. Relief
has to be bigger. It has to do more. We need cash not
just food.” The irony of this trend was not lost on sever-
al interviewees who cited pledges made by humanitari-
an organisations and donors at the World Humanitarian
Summit to increase the proportion of assistance made
in cash.
5. Conclusions
Clearly, risk management has colonised new social rela-
tionships in the humanitarian sector and the precau-
tionary principle itself has emerged as a central organ-
ising principle of programming. In the name of terror-
ism’s generalized danger, humanitarianism has increas-
ingly been commandeered by more authoritarian and
totalizing rationalities. The ‘manufactured’ risk of bank
derisking reflects Beck’s original idea that late-modern
society manufactures and is preoccupied by new forms
of risk and governs these through institutions that strug-
gle to be effective and, perversely, contribute to the prop-
agation of more risk. Most obviously, this has reduced
the capacity of NGOs to conduct financial transactions,
weakened programming, stifled innovation and counter-
productively (from a regulatory perspective) encouraged
the use of informal, more opaque and risky money trans-
fer systems such as the Syrian hawala system (which has
itself been penetrated by groups with black-market and
armed-actor affiliations). These mechanisms are more
vulnerable to abuse by terrorists and put staff and vol-
unteers of charities at greater personal risk. The tyranny
of risk thinking has also resulted in a dramatic reduction
in the willingness and ability of NGOs to provide assis-
tance to communities under the control of proscribed
organisations. This echoes the recurring theme of coun-
terproductive outcomes of managing risk found in the
risk literature.
Risk logic is not characterised by an existential threat
to a valued referent object leading to exceptional mea-
sures against external and ungovernable threatening
others. Rather, it posits risks (understood as conditions
of possibility for harm) to a referent object leading to per-
manent changes aimed at reducing perceived vulnerabil-
ity and boosting governance-capacity of the valued ref-
erent object itself. It also leads to a logic of overcompen-
sation and the creation of buffers against risk. The focus
on the possibility of harm rather than the immediacy of a
more quantifiable threat creates a momentum towards
a “rationality of zero-risk” (Aradau & vanMunster, 2007).
Identifying NGOs as providers of, and subject to, risk
has also made them governable in several ways. Firstly,
states, particularly Turkey, have been able to manage
the risk exposure of NGOs in ways that render them
more vulnerable to instrumental and opportunistic con-
trol. In terms of systemic and non-disciplinary forms of
governance, Syrian NGOs have also been co-opted into
subordinate positions in the global humanitarian system
via the adoption of modes of professionalism and man-
agerialism that are intended to manage programmatic
and fiduciary risk as well as alignment with global finan-
cial regulatory policies. These processes legitimise some
NGOs (and exclude others) behind myths of manageri-
al competency but potentially render them less able to
manage the humanitarian risks to besieged populations.
Empirically, this research identified that patterns
of access to life-saving resources are increasingly dis-
ciplined both by banks’ risk-based responses to CTF
regulatory mechanisms and, crucially, the humanitari-
an communities’ own precautionary approach to the
risks that these generate. There is a clear pattern of
both international and Turkish-based banks retreating
from engagement with NGOs functioning in Syria. These
effects are concentrated amongst (but not exclusive to)
Islamic NGOs working on conflict areas in sanctioned
states or where proscribed organisations function. There
is also clear evidence of a precautionary risk dispositif
arising from bank derisking and permeating humanitar-
ian decision-making. Interviews revealed that the threat
of bank account closures had become a major factor in
programming decisions—generating a reflex of risk aver-
sion and containment rather thanproportionate respons-
es to risks.
The exclusion of particularly the smaller NGOs from
financial access also appears to have a disproportionate
influence on the risks faced by isolated beneficiary com-
munities. The majority of INGOs subcontract their work
to the smaller NGOs. Hence amore cautious approach to
their risk tolerance amplifies the effects of derisking on
the most vulnerable beneficiary communities. It is ironic
that whilst non-Muslim and secular agencies have been
forced to rely increasingly on Muslim charities to deliver
assistance in places such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria
and Yemen, it is precisely these organisations that have
faced the greatest obstacles to accessing the financial
services that make this arrangement possible.
The differential impact on besieged areas also
reflects Foucault’s (1980) notion that modernity is char-
acterized by a bio-politics of regulatory controls and com-
plexes that express the “power to foster life or disallow
it.” In this sense, populations under the control of pro-
scribed organisations are governed through the denial of
their rescue through humanitarian assistance, a very lib-
eral tyranny. This also parallels Beck’s predictions that in
a ‘risk society’ the accumulation of danger-averse strate-
gies in response to incalculable but imminent institution-
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al and reputational risks necessarily entails an inevitable
emergence of a collective risk identity and the formation
of communities united by their increasing vulnerability
to risk.
In conclusion, risk management itself can therefore
lead to the ‘risk’ that we exclude all that does not con-
form to a narrow and myopic logic of managerial inter-
vention, thereby undermining themorally universal ethic
of humanitarianism.
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